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MARKETS OVERT, VOIDABLE TITLES, AND 
FECKLESS AGENTS: JUDGES AND EFFICIENCY IN 
THE ANTEBELLUM DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH 
PURCHASE 
HAROLD R. WEINBERG* 
In co~sidering American common law doctrines shaped dur-
ing the nineteenth century, commentators have advanced differ-
ing theories on the primary judicial criteria employed by judges. 
Recent studies have argued that these doctrines reflect a crite-
rion of economic efficiency.l This work has been criticized for its 
failure to explain why· there seems to be .a correlation between 
efficiency and these decision rules or why judges might have pre-
ferred efficiency over other decisional crit~ria .. 2 Other studies 
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author's Fellowship in Law and 
Economics at the University of Chicago provided the opportunity to prepare an initial 
draft of this paper. It and subsequent drafts benefited from discussions with Tony 
Freyer, John Langbein, and at a University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop. 
The paper also reflects insights gained through the author's participation on a panel that 
considered antebellum commercial law during the 1980 Annual Meeting of the American 
Society for Legal History. Valuable student research assistance was provided by Christo-
pher Hill and Joseph La Vela. 
1. An overview of the economic 'approach may be found in Posner, Some Uses and 
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 281-84 (1979). 
2. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191, 220·22 (1980); 
Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 307, 312 (1979); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of 
Law, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1015 (1978). Other criticisms abound. See papers by Kronman, 
Rizzo, Fried & Driscoll in Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspec-
1 
2 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
have proposed that many judicial doctrines announced before 
the Civil War were intended to facilitate or ratify major shifts in 
the distribution of social wealth.3 This article seeks to determine 
the extent to which antebellum American judges employed eco-
nomic efficiency as a criterion in formulating decision rules ap-
plicable to disputes between the owners and good faith purchas-
ers of goods." It necessarily also considers the possibility of other 
judicial criteria including the redistribution of wealth. 
The decisions selected for study generally arose in the fol-
lowing situation. A's goods come into the possession of B. Aft"er 
one or more additional transfers, the goods come to rest in the 
hands of C, a good faith purchaser. A then seeks to recover the 
goods (or their value) from C who was previously unaware of A's 
claim. Confronted with this situation, antebellum. courts focused 
on the circumstances under which A and A"s goods parted com-
pany_ 5 All permitted A to recover his goods when they had been 
stolen by ~ even if C would have been protected by the English 
doctrine of market overt. American courts developed the voida-
ble title doctrine which permitted A to prevail over C when the 
goods had been taken from A by B through some, but not all, 
types of fraud. If A's transfer was to B as A's agent, recovery 
from C was dependent upon the application of principles of 
agency and estoppel. 
In an earlier paper, this author employed economic analysis 
tives, 9 J. Legal Stpd. 189-427 (1980). It may be methodologically correct to test a theory 
by ascertaining its predictive power while ignoring its assumptions. See M. Friedman, 
The Methodology of Positive Economics in Essays in Positive Economics 1-43 (1966). 
But see Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago: Richard A. Posner and the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 439, 467-72 (1978). But even the staunchest 
defenders of the economic approach admit an interest in a theory of judicial behavior 
that would explain why the common law evolved toward efficiency. See R. Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law § 19.7 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Economic Analysis]; 
Landes & Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. 
Legal Stud. 367 (1980). 
3. See generally M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Transformation]. 
4. Thus, this paper is not an addition to the literature which seeks to explain the 
origin of efficient common law through "invisible hand" models that are not dependent 
on a judicial predilection for efficiencY. See Rubin, Predictability and the Economic Ap-
proach to Law, 9 J. Legal Stud. 319, 329 (1980). 
5. Whether a particular purchaser was entitled to good faith purchaser status was 
also an issue in some of the cases. See, e.g., Fawcett, Isham & Co. v. Osborn: Adams & 
Co., 32 rue 411 (1863). The classic study of this pattern is contained in Gilmore, The 
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057 (1954). 
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to explain this pattern of purchaser protection .. 6 Significant the-
oretical considerations in this study included each decision rule's 
impact on the demand for and supply of illegitimate goods in 
the marketplace. and the comparative efficiency of owners and 
good faith purchasers with respect to their ability to prevent the 
risk that goods would move from the former class to the latter. 
However, the earlier paper analyzed the pattern under modern-
day conditions and did not consider whether it was the product 
of judges who sought to announce efficient decision rules. This 
paper explores the pattern's antebellum roots.7 
MARKETS OVERT 
The market overt doctrine reached its fullest English devel-
opment by the sixteenth century. It matured in a feudal and 
agrarian society in which periodic and carefully controlled 
chartered or customary markets and fairs provided significant 
opportunities for trade.8 Blackstone provided a description of 
the doctrine: 
[P]roperty may also in some cases be transferred by sale, 
though the vendor hath none at all in the goods: for it is expe-
dient that the buyer, by taking proper precautions, may at all 
events be secure of his purchase; otherwise all commerce be-
tween man and man must soon be at an end. And therefore, 
the general rule of law is.. . . that all sales and contracts of any 
thing vendible, in fairs and markets overt .. ... (that is, open), 
shall not only be good between the parties, but also be binding 
on all those that have any right or property therein. And for 
this purpose . . .. were tolls established in markets, viz. to tes-
tify the making of contracts . . .. . But if my goods are stolen 
from me, and sold, out of market overt, my property is not al-
6. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal 
Stud. 569 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sales Law]. 
7. The author makes no claim of methodological purity. See note 2 supra. It was 
an interest in the pattern of purchaser protection which led to a preliminary review of 
the cases and history. This, in turn, led to the writing of Sales Law~ supra note 6, the 
completion of which made it possible to complete this paper. 
8. See generally 5 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 104-05 (2d ed. 1937); 
T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 665 (5th ed.1956); 2 F. Pollock & 
F. Maitland, The History of English Law 154 (2d ed. 1899); M. Postan. The Medieval 
Economy and Society: An Economic History of Britain 1100-1500, at 183,207-09 (1969); 
Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 
375, 380 (1908) [hereinafter cited as Market Overt]; Pease, Market Overt in the City of 
London, 31 L.Q. Rev. 270 (I915) [hereinafter cited as City of London]. 
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tered, and I may take them wherever I find them ..... [I]f the 
buyer knoweth the property not to be in the seller; or there be 
any other fraud in the transaction; if he knoweth the seller to 
he an infant, or feme-covert not usually trading for herself; if 
the sale be not originally and wholly made in the fair or mar ... 
ket, or not at the usual hours; the owner's property is not 
bound thereby ...... By which wise regulations the common law 
has secured the right of the proprietor in personal chattels 
from being devested, so far as was consistent with that other 
necessary policy, that purchasers, bona fide, in a fair, open, 
and regular manner, should not be afterwards put to difficul-
ties by reason of the previous knavery of the seller.s 
An additional justification for affording limited negotiability 
to goods can be found in Coke, who wrote that "the common 
Law did hold it for a point of great policie, and [advantageous] 
for the Commonwealth, that Faires and Markets overt should be 
replenished and weJI furnished with all manner of commodities 
.... for the necessary [sustenance] and use of the people."IO 
Markets and fairs were so beneficial that it was essential "to in-
courage men thereunto. "11 
Blackstone and Coke also described two exceptions to the 
doctrine, both reflecting the impact of property crime.12 First, if 
a thief was prosecuted to conviction the owner was entitled to 
the return of his goods.1s Second, there were statutory formali-
ties that had to be complied with in order to pass title to horses. 
Coke explained the first exception as intended to encourage the 
owner to pursue the felon so that he might be punished. He be-
lieved that the "old ru1e, Caveat emptor" was preferable in the 
"rare case" where the exception would result in a loss to a good 
9. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 449·55 (Bell ed. 1771) [hereinafter cited as 
Commentaries] (emphasis in original). Blackstone was influential in America during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 88-
89,98 (1973) [hereinafter cited as History of American Law]. Payment of a toll, although 
it would tend to show that a sale actually occurred with the knowledge of an official of 
the market or fair, and thus go to the bonafides and openness of the sale, was generally 
not mandatory to the protection of a purchaser in market overt. Market Overt, supra 
note 8, at 378-79. 
10. 2 E. Coke, The Institutes of the Lawes of England 713 (1642). 
11. Id. 
12. See generally Crime in England 1550-1800, at 49-51,60 (J. Cockburn edt 1977). 
13. Commentaries, supra note 9, at 449-50. See generally Market Overt~ supra 
note 8, at 378-83; Brickey, The Jurisprudence of Larceny: An Historical Inquiry and 
Interest Analysis~ 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1101, 1116, 1122-24, 1132 (1980). 





































